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Dalton: Criminal Law - Submission to the Jury of Lesser Included Offenses

CRIMINAL LAW-SUBMISSION TO THE JURY OF LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSES-State v. Thompson, 297 N.C. 285,
254 S.E.2d 526 (1979).
INTRODUCTION

Whether or not the judge in a criminal trial is required to
charge the jury on a lesser included offense is of utmost importance to a criminal defendant, his counsel and the court. Failure to
instruct on lesser included offenses when required will result in a
new trial for defendant. From the attorney's standpoint, failure to
request such a charge may reveal inadequate representation of his
client. The courts have a stake in insuring that required lesser included offenses are addressed at the trial level because failure to
do so results in renewed litigation and further expense to both the
state and the defendant.1
The determinative factor for charging on a lesser included offense is the presence of evidence offered at trial from which a jury
could find that such a crime of a lesser degree was committed.
Where a state presents evidence tending to show the crime charged
and where neither party presents conflicting evidence on any of the
elements, a court is not required to instruct on the lesser offense.
The North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the sufficiency of
conflicting evidence relating to use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon in an armed robbery charge. Without specifically defining conflicting evidence, the Court unequivocably stated what
evidence is not sufficiently conflicting to requireoan instruction for
common law robbery.2
THE CASE

Defendant, armed with a chrome pistol, and accomplice,
armed with a shotgun, forced three employees into a storage room
during an attempted robbery. Defendant was tried for armed
robbery.3
All three victims testified for the State on direct examination
1. State v. Hicks, 241 N.C. 156, 84 S.E.2d 545 (1954) (armed robbery and
assault).
2. State v. Thompson, 297 N.C. 285, 254 S.E.2d 526 (1979).
3. Id. at 286, 254 S.E.2d at 526.
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that defendant used a chrome pistol and his accomplice, a shotgun.
On cross-examination the first of the three testified:
As to whether it is true that I don't know whether the shotgun
. ..was a real gun, a fake gun, a toy gun, or what kind of gun,
whatever kind of gun it was, it was metal and did not look like a
toy . . .With respect to the pistol . . . it was metal and did not
look like a toy. I do not know whether it was real or whether it
was a toy. It was shiny like chrome.'
The State's second witness testified on cross-examination that he
did not know whether the pistol was real or fake, but "[i]t looked
very real. It was not a cap pistol."'5 The State's third witness did
not modify his testimony on cross-examination.
The trial judge charged the jury on armed robbery only. The
jury returned a verdict of guilty.
On appeal defendant contended the court erred in failing to
instruct on common law robbery on the ground that conflicting evidence was offered at trial relating to the use or threatened use of a
dangerous weapon.' The North Carolina Court of Appeals,7 with
Judge Erwin dissenting, held the trial court erred in failing to submit the common law robbery charge to the jury based on precedent
established in State v. Bailey.'
The North Carolina Supreme Court, following the reasoning of
Judge Erwin's dissent, reversed and overruled Bailey insofar as the
two decisions are inconsistent.9 The Court held that evidence of
the witnesses' uncertainty elicited on cross-examination was not of
sufficient probative value to warrant submission of the lesser included offense of common law robbery.10 The lack of certainty of
the State's witnesses on cross-examination as to whether or not the
gun was real or a toy is not conflicting evidence relating to the
elements of the crime charged.
BACKGROUND

Common law robbery is the felonious taking of any money or
goods either from a person himself or while in a person's presence
4. State v. Thompson, 39 N.C. App. 375, 385-86, 250 S.E.2d 710, 716 (1979).
5. State v. Thompson, 297 N.C. 285, 288, 254 S.E.2d 526, 528 (1979).
6. Id. at 287, 254 S.E.2d at 527.
7. State v. Thompson, 39 N.C. App. 375, 250 S.E.2d 710 (1979).
8. 278 N.C. 80, 178 S.E.2d 809, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1971).
9. State v. Thompson, 297 N.C. 285, 254 S.E.2d 526 (1979).
10. Id. at 289, 254 S.E.2d at 529.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol2/iss1/14
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or control, against his will, by fear or violence." Statutory armed
robbery1 2 does not alter common law robbery except to impose a
more severe punishment when firearms or other dangerous weap14
ons are threatened or used" to endanger the life of a victim.
The actual presence of a firearm as a constituent element of
armed robbery in North Carolina was established in State v. Keller.'5 The court in Keller determined that the word "use" in the
armed robbery statute means:
[an] "act employing anything, or state of being employed; ... as,
the use of a pen, his machines are in use," and may signify the
"method or way of using"- Webster. The words "threatened use"
coupled, as they are, with the preceding words clearly indicate the
threatened act of employing. Hence, construed contextually the
clause "with the use or threatened use" of a weapon, requires...
the presence of the weapon with which the act may be executed
or threatened."0
Common 7 law robbery is a lesser included offense of armed
robbery.'
The implications of a prosecuting witness' statement standing
alone on cross-examination that he could not say the object in defendant's hand absolutely was a dangerous weapon were established in State v. Bailey.' 8 In Bailey, the State's sole eyewitness'
testified on cross-examination that she was not certain whether defendant used a "real or toy pistol."' 9 Defendant's confession was
introduced including his statement that he had used a .22 caliber
pistol during the robbery; however, defendant testified that the effect of wine and heroin on him during the day of the robbery
caused him to forget anything about using a weapon. 20 The court
concluded that the conflicting testimony of the State's witness
11. State v. Burke, 73 N.C. 83 (1875).
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-87 (1978).
13. State v. Jones, 227 N.C. 402, 42 S.E.2d 465 (1947).
14. State v. Lee, 282 N.C. 566, 193 S.E.2d 705 (1973).
15. 214 N.C. 447, 199 S.E. 620 (1938). Defendant was convicted of armed robbery by placing his finger against the victim's head. The court granted a new trial.
16. Id. at 449, 199 S.E. at 621.
17. State v. Bell, 228 N.C. 659, 46 S.E.2d 834 (1949). In a prosecution for
armed robbery, the accused may be convicted of other lesser included offenses:
assault, larceny from the person or simple larceny.
18. 278 N.C. 80, 178 S.E.2d 809 (1971).
19. Id. at 87, 178 S.E.2d at 813.
20. Id.
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along with defendant's own testimony raised an issue as to whether
or not defendant had a firearm in his possession which required a
submission of common law robbery.21
Recent decisions treat the requirement of the actual presence
of a firearm in an armed robbery case more liberally. The witness
need not actually have seen the weapon used in the robbery to
submit the charge of armed robbery to the jury. The court in State
v. Dark22 said, "eyesight is not the only sensory mechanism by
which one can experience an object. ' 23 In Dark, defendant was
convicted
of armed robbery on the basis that the victim heard a
"click" 4 and felt the barrel of a pistol against his head, even
though the only weapon introduced at trial was a toy pistol found
in defendant's room.2 5 Furthermore, a common law robbery charge
is not required where no evidence is presented indicating that the
instrument was not a gun or that it was incapable of firing. Such
was the result in State v. Evans2s where defendant had to replace
the bullets in and close his gun when it unbreached as he drew it.
ANALYSIS

The North Carolina Supreme Court in Thompson overruled
State v. Bailey27 and held that the lack of certainty of State witnesses on cross-examination as to whether the gun was real or not
was not conflicting evidence relating to the elements of the crime
charged. Thompson held that:
[W]hen the State offers evidence in an armed robbery case that
the robbery was attempted or accomplished by the use or
threatened use of what appeared to the victim to be a firearm or
other dangerous weapon, evidence elicited on cross-examination
that the witness or witnesses could not positively testify that the
instrument used was in fact a firearm or dangerous weapon is not
of sufficient probative value to warrant submission of the lesser
21. Id.
22. 26 N.C. App. 610, 216 S.E.2d 498 (1975).
23. Id. at 612, 216 S.E.2d at 500.
24. Id. at 611, 216 S.E.2d at 499.
25. But see State v. Jackson, 27 N.C. App. 675, 219 S.E.2d 816 (1975). A
State's witness testified that defendant had "something under a towel that looked
like a pistol or sawed off shotgun." On cross-examination the witness was unable
to testify with certainty whether or not it was a weapon. The court held failure to
instruct for common law robbery was error.
26. 25 N.C. App. 459, 213 S.E.2d 389 (1975).
27. 278 N.C. 80, 178 S.E.2d 809, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1971).
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included offense of common law robbery.28
The Court relied heavily on Judge Erwin's dissent in the
Court of Appeals. 9 Judge Erwin distinguished Bailey, limiting it
to its facts, and found that the record did not show sufficient conflict or uncertainty of testimony to require a submission of common law robbery.3 0 Judge Erwin felt that Bailey was not decided
improperly but that it was being applied improperly by the majority of the Court of Appeals by requiring victims of robberies "to
make an inspection of the weapons used to be able to testify
whether or not the weapons were in fact real.""1
Justice Branch of the North Carolina Supreme Court noted
that the instant case might be distinguished from Bailey because
in Thompson the three witnesses gave more forceful testimony regarding the authenticity of the weapon compared to the testimony
of a single witness in Bailey; 2 .one witness in Thompson remained
certain as to the authenticity of the weapon. Defendant's conduct
also could have served as a basis to distinguish the cases. In Bailey
defendant testified he was intoxicated on wine and heroin and
could not remember anything about the incident;33 in Thompson
defendant offered no evidence on the issue of possession of a
34
deadly weapon but only offered an alibi as a defense.
The Thompson Court, by overruling Bailey, indicated that it
was affirmatively establishing what was not conflicting evidence
sufficient to require the trial judge to instruct the jury as to the
lesser included offense.
CONCLUSION

Thompson focused on a narrow but important segment of the
law dealing with when the judge in a criminal trial for armed robbery was required to charge the jury on the lesser included offense
of common law robbery. The determinative factor was the presence
28. 297 N.C. 285, 289, 254 S.E.2d 526, 528 (1979).
29. 39 N.C. App. 375, 250 S.E.2d 710 (1979). Judge Erwin argued in dissent
that the conflicting testimony was not of sufficient probative value to raise an
issue as to whether or not defendant had a firearm in his possession.
30. Id. at 386, 250 S.E.2d at 716.
31. Id.
32. State v. Thompson, 297 N.C. 285, 288, 254 S.E.2d 526, 528 (1979).
33. 297 N.C. at 287, 254 S.E.2d at 527. Furthermore, defendant made a confession but could not remember if his Miranda rights were read to him.
34. Id.
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of evidence of defendant's guilt of the crime of common law robbery.- 5 If such evidence existed it was reversible error for the court
to fail to submit the lesser offense to the jury. 6
Although the critical difference between armed robbery and
common law robbery is the actual presence of a firearm; the uncertainty as to the authenticity of the weapon of the prosecuting witness on cross-examination does not raise an issue for the jury as to
whether or not defendant used or threatened to use a firearm or
other dangerous weapon. Thus a charge on the lesser offense of
common law robbery is not required.
Because the Court did not distinguish Bailey on the basis of
firmer testimony in Thompson concerning the authenticity of the
weapon and the lack of rebuttal evidence, the Court seemed to be
searching for an opportunity to overrule Bailey. Thus, Thompson
can be cited for the proposition that something less than absolute
certainty on cross-examination is not sufficient in and of itself to
require the submission of the lesser included offense to the jury. If
a court hears a later case with facts identical to Bailey, namely,
where the witness on cross-examination is not positively certain
whether or not the weapon is real and where defendant is uncertain of his use of a weapon, then the court should deny instruction
on common law robbery. This result is mandated by the Supreme
Court's refusal to distinguish Bailey on these facts and its overruling of Bailey insofar as it conflicts with Thompson.
Tony Carlton Dalton

35. State v. Hicks, 241 N.C. 156, 84 S.E.2d 545 (1954).
36. Id.
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